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This paper analyzes potential cost savings to the U.S. agricultural sector 
associated with applying marketable permit designs for methyl bromide critical use 
exemptions (CUE), under the phase-out of methyl bromide.  A necessary condition for an 
efficient trading system is heterogeneity among methyl bromide users with respect to the 
costs of switching to potential alternative pest control measures, which would lead to cost 
savings from trading.  Using data on these costs from current methyl bromide users, the 
authors show that this necessary condition appears to be met, and characterize the 
potential cost savings that could occur if critical use permits can be traded from methyl 
bromide users with lower costs to those with higher costs.  Several potential mechanisms 
for implementing these trades are considered, and differ in the extent to which permit for 
use may be traded within a commodity-use, or traded among methyl bromide users 
producing different commodities.  The total incremental costs of the simulated trading 
system were higher when permits are traded only among methyl bromide users within a 
commodity sector, while the costs were lowest when the methyl bromide users are 
allowed to freely trade their permits across sectors.   3 
INTRODUCTION 
       Methyl bromide is a pesticide to control insects, nematodes, weeds, pathogens, 
and rodents.  Methyl bromide is primary used in agriculture for soil fumigation, 
commodity treatment, and structural fumigation.  Methyl bromide is used in the U.S. 
for soil fumigation prior to planting crops to control a broad spectrum of soil pests.  
Tomatoes and strawberries account for about 50 percent of the total methyl bromide 
use in the United States.  Others such as perennial crops, pepper, and ornamental and 
nursery crops widely use methyl bromide to control soil pests and account for about 35 
percent of the total methyl bromide use.  Methyl bromide is also used for protecting the 
quality of commodities in storage and for food-processing facilities for pest control.  
Methyl bromide uses for post-harvest treatments account for about 15 percent of the 
total methyl bromide use (United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), 
2003a).  
Under the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) and the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the production and import of methyl bromide 
in the United States is scheduled for phase out by January 1, 2005.  The Montreal 
Protocol is an international treaty for protecting the earth’s ozone layer by controlling the 
production and trade of ozone-depleting chemicals (such as chlorofluorocarbons, or 
CFCs).  In 1992, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol listed methyl bromide as an ozone-
depleting substances and the Treaty is now phasing out the production and trade of 
methyl bromide.  The United States is committed to implementing the Montreal Protocol 
to protect the ozone layer, and the CAAA required the general use of methyl bromide in 
U.S. to be phased out by January 1, 2005, in accordance with the Montreal Protocol.   4 
The Protocol includes a provision for continued use of methyl bromide in cases 
where technically and economically feasible alternatives are not available, in order to 
provide additional transition time for methyl bromide users to adopt technically and 
economically feasible alternative fumigants.  Current users of methyl bromide have the 
option to apply for a critical use exemption (CUE), and the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency invited applications for CUEs from individuals and groups of methyl 
bromide users.  EPA reviewed the submitted CUE applications for their current use of 
methyl bromide, and paid special attention to the availability of alternatives identified by 
the Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee (MBTOC).   
Based on the economic analyses of estimating costs and revenues associated with 
the use of methyl bromide and technically feasible alternatives, the U.S. EPA nominated 
a set of methyl bromide uses for CUEs, under the Montreal Protocol.  These uses, for 
crop production and structural/storage operation, were deemed critical because available 
alternative are either technically or economically infeasible.  The international parties of 
the Montreal Protocol are currently reviewing the CUE nominations and are expected to 
report findings and recommendations by the Fall of 2003. The goal of this paper is to 
explore the feasibility of implementing the allocation of methyl bromide CUEs with 
permit trading, by assessing whether the economic conditions exist to support a market-
based approach as one option among many.  We look at some specific data on costs of 
production for methyl bromide users, introduce a basic theoretical model for permit 
trading, simulate some results using the permit trading model, and suggest directions for 
further work to expand analyses of this option.     5 
     In the environmental economics literature, traditional direct control approaches 
have been criticized as more costly than marketable permit systems to achieve 
environmental quality standards.  Theoretically, marketable permit systems could allow 
polluters with higher costs for emission control to buy permits from polluters with 
lower costs.  Under certain conditions, total aggregate abatement costs can be reduced 
and pollution abatement achieved at a lower cost to the economy.  However, the actual 
realized benefit from a marketable permit system may not be as big as the theoretically 
conceivable benefit associated with marketable permit systems due to the difficulties of 
implementing marketable permit systems. 
      Marketable permit systems have been used in areas of air quality management, 
renewable energy, solid waste management, and water resources management.  
Implementation of such market-based mechanisms depends on meeting well-known 
theoretical conditions and overcoming practical difficulties.   Emission trading in the 
energy sector is one area where a marketable permit system has received 
considerable attention (Berry, 2002; Boots, 2003; Nielsen and Jeppesen, 2003).  
Solid waste management is another area where researchers have examined 
marketable permit system as an efficient tool to meet minimum recycling targets 
(Sprenger, 1999; Allen and et al., 1993; Dinan, 1992).  The marketable permit system 
has been extensively studied in water resources management to reduce water 
pollution in a cost-effective way (Austin, 2001; Morgan and et al., 2001; Stephenson 
and Shabman, 2001).  Many studies (Atkinson and Lewis, 1974; Atkinson and 
Tietenberg, 1982; Oates, Portney and McGartland, 1989; Tietenberg, 1995; 
Schmalensee and Joskow, 1998) have found that marketable permit systems can be   6 
more cost-effective than fixed allocation approaches in achieving emission reduction 
targets or air quality objectives.   
      Pesticide regulatory policy in the U.S. is most commonly directed toward 
mitigating risk with stipulations on how a pesticide is used (rates, timing, equipment, 
etc.), which determines risk.  Trading of pesticide risk, per se, has not been explored, in 
part because of the link between use pattern and risk.  Hence, no study has been 
identified to look at potential cost savings of applying marketable permit designs for 
pesticide uses.  Methyl bromide, in its role as an ozone depleting chemical, is different 
because ozone depletion is almost (but not entirely) separable from use patterns.
1  
Therefore, this paper explores the potential of marketable permit systems to provide the 
methyl bromide users with more flexibility in meeting their required reduction of 
methyl bromide use in a cost-effective way.  An objective of this study is to analyze the 
potential cost savings of marketable permit systems for methyl bromide under a CUE 
program.  
 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM: MARKETABLE PERMIT DESIGN  
          Through economic analysis of the CUE applications, EPA gathered a substantial 
body of data on potential losses in revenue and increases in operating costs associated 
with alternative pest control regimens.  These data helped EPA to estimate the 
incremental costs that might accrue in the absence of methyl bromide.  The incremental 
costs associated with the use of alternatives appeared to have a wide range among the 
                                                                 
1 There are other risk from methyl bromide beyond ozone depletion, and these risk are addressed by EPA in 
implementing the Federal Fungicide, Rodenticide, and Insecticide Act (FIFRA).  For the purposes of a 
CUE program we focus on ozone depletion in this paper.  Site specific factors can also affect the ozone 
depletion potential of a given methyl bromide use (soil moisture and temperature status, length of contact   7 
CUE applications.  For example, the incremental costs for structural/storage uses are 
mainly from production delays due to a longer treatment time and required capital 
expenditures with alternatives.  Costs of adoption methyl bromide alternatives (per unit 
of commodity) may be higher in these industries than in crop production systems.    
Within the CUE applications for crop production, incremental costs varied due to the 
fact that different methyl bromide alternatives were available for different crops, 
depending on a range of factors.   
      A permit trading system is intended to reduce the total control costs (across 
methyl bromide users) of meeting the target for emissions.  In the case of emission 
trading for power plants, this may mean minimizing the cost of expenditures on 
equipment.  In the case of methyl bromide, the “cost” may include changes in 
expenditures, as well as changes in gross revenue because methyl bromide is a 
productive input, rather than simply an undesirable output.  Assume that methyl 
bromide trading occurs on a one-for-one basis, that is, reduction in use of one pound in 
one place is offset by an identical increase in another place.  This assumption is 
generally valid because there is no spatial dispersion effect of methyl bromide use; 
nearly and all emissions can be considered to have the same effects on the ozone layer.   
This objective can be represented as finding the set of individual methyl bromide uses, 
Xi
MeBr , that  minimize the total cost of meeting (or exceeding) a target in use reduction: 
 
where, 
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Ci :  total incremental costs of switching to methyl bromide alternatives for i
th methyl 
bromide users  
Xi
MeBr : the number of kilograms of methyl bromide to be replaced with alternatives  
for i
th methyl bromide user 
E: the total reduction of methyl bromide in kilograms required for the United States 
This is equivalent to minimizing the following Lagrangian: 
where, 
l:  the Lagrangian multiplier 
 
From the first-order condition (FOC), a solution satisfies: 
 
  Equation 3 implies that when the cost is minimized for reducing methyl bromide 
use, then the marginal costs of replacing methyl bromide with alternatives are the same 
across all methyl bromide users.  The equation above also shows that the marginal cost 
for each methyl bromide user should be equal to the Lagrangian multiplier, which 
reflects the value of changing (increasing or decreasing) the target for methyl bromide 
use reduction.  In other words, it represents the change in the total incremental costs 
associated with a change in the total reduction of methyl bromide required for the 
United States.  The total costs of meeting the reduction of methyl bromide required for 
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the United States would be minimized if each methyl bromide user reduced the use of 
methyl bromide such that its marginal cost is equal to its contribution to the total costs. 
      However, this condition may not hold because the marginal costs may be 
constant and different across all CUE applicants.  In practice, the total costs of 
switching to alternatives for all CUE applicants are more likely to be minimized when 
applicants with lower costs switch to alternatives first, until the total required reduction 
in the United States is attained.   The marginal cost for the last user applicant switching 
to methyl bromide alternatives should be equal to the estimated Lagrangian multiplier.   
       This study analyzes the potential efficiency improvement associated with 
implementation of two different marketable permit designs to the U.S. agricultural 
production sectors:  1) a Sectoral Marketable Permit System (SMPS) that allows one-
to-one permit trading only for methyl bromide in the same sector (e.g., tomatoes, 
peppers), and 2) Uniform Marketable Permit System (UMPS) in which all the methyl 
bromide users freely trade their methyl bromide permits.  The incremental costs 
accounted for in this study are the sum of economic losses from reduced yields and 
increased production costs associated with the use of alternatives.
2  Therefore, the cost 
savings indicated in this study represent the differences between the total costs of 
marketable permit systems to the U.S. agricultural production sectors and those of a 
system whereby CUEs are fixed based on historical methyl bromide use or production 
output. 
 
DATA    10 
       The methyl bromide users considered for this study represent individual 
growers, consortia, and industries using methyl bromide for crop production such as 
tomatoes and strawberry, and for fumigation of stored commodities and structural 
fumigation (e.g., flour mills).  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
received fifty-six critical use exemption (CUE) applications for 2002.  These 
applications were aggregated into16 sectors for the purpose of the U.S. nomination of 
CUEs to the International Parties of the Montreal Protocol.  Table 1 lists the sectors 
(and the amount of methyl bromide requested) in the U.S. nomination: tomatoes, 
strawberries, cucurbits, peppers, orchard replant, food processing, turfgrass, sweet 
potatoes, forest seedlings, commodity uses, eggplant, strawberry nursery, orchard 
seedlings, ornamental nurseries, ginger, and tobacco.  The U.S. nomination for each 
crop/use was based on the economic and technical evaluation of the use of methyl 
bromide and alternatives, and also other factors such as regulatory constraints (buffer 
zones and township caps) and environmental considerations (groundwater 
contamination, historic use rate, and etc.).  The total amount of 9,920,965 kilograms for 
2005 was nominated for the sixteen sectors by the United States, which comprises 39 
percent of the 1991 baseline (US EPA, 2003b). 
 
Why does switching to methyl bromide alternatives lead to costs? 
Economic analyses were only conducted for pre-plant and post-harvest uses when 
EPA and USDA identified an alternative to be technically feasible in the CUE review 
process.  For pre-plant uses, economic impacts arise due to potential losses in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 This doesn’t include transaction costs, R&D for adopting new alternatives, etc.  Depending on who would 
incur the costs, sellers or buyers of permits, not including these costs could over or underestimate the   11 
revenue, both from yield declines (when alternatives are less efficient) and increases 
in operating costs.  For example, supplementary weed control or additional irrigation 
may be required when adopting methyl bromide alternatives.  CUE reviewers 
analyzed crop budgets for pre-plant sectors to determine the likely economic impact 
if methyl bromide were unavailable.  Efforts were also made to quantify economic 
impacts to methyl bromide users due to decreases in grade and quality of the crops 
that lead to changes in the prices producers receive; however, not all potential 
economic losses were quantifiable.     
     Economic losses in the post-harvest sectors can be characterized as arising 
from three contributing factors.  First, the direct pest control costs increased in most 
cases because alternatives such as phosphine and heat treatment are more expensive 
(increased labor time required for longer treatment time and increased number of 
treatments.  Second, large capital expenditures may be required to adopt an 
alternative.  For example, investments to retrofit a facility may be necessary to make 
it suitable for heat treatment.  Finally, additional production downtimes for the use of 
alternatives are unavoidable.  Many facilities operate at or near full production 
capacity and alternatives that take longer than methyl bromide or require more 
frequent application can result in manufacturing slowdowns, shutdowns, and 
shipping delays.  Slowing down production would result in additional costs to the 
methyl bromide users. 
      Economic loss was calculated as the additional costs, per kilogram of methyl 
bromide, if methyl bromide users had to replace methyl bromide with available 
alternatives.  Comparing these losses provides a rough measure of the loss in economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
efficiency gains from trading.   12 
efficiency associated with adoption of methyl bromide alternatives.  This measure 
indicates incremental cost of switching to the available alternatives and was used to 
estimate potential cost savings to the U.S. agricultural sector through the use of a 
marketable permit system for methyl bromide.  EPA reviewed each CUE application 
and estimated the incremental costs associated with the use of alternatives for the 
methyl bromide users represented in each application (US EPA, 2003b).   
      Table 2 shows technically feasible alternatives and the economic loss per 
kilogram of methyl bromide for each sector.  Economic losses for each sector are 
presented as a range because different yield losses were estimated for different 
alternatives and the methyl bromide users within each sector.  Variations in price and 
operating expenses across different methyl bromide users within each sector also 
contributed to variability in the range of economic losses.  Appendix A shows the 
technically feasible alternative and the estimated economic loss per kilogram of methyl 
bromide across methyl bromide CUE applicants.  These estimates were used to 
estimate the potential cost savings associated with implementation of a marketable 
permit system, and are based on methyl bromide users adopting the best available 
alternatives (lowest cost).  This analysis incorporates CUE reviewers’ point estimates 
of the most likely yield and quality losses associated with these alternatives.  Different 
methyl bromide alternatives and point estimates of yield changes would lead to 
different estimates of the potential cost savings of a methyl bromide marketable permit 
system.  
      The economic loss of replacing methyl bromide with alternatives ranged from 
$6 to $607 per kilogram of methyl bromide, depending on the methyl bromide use.    13 
The economic losses per kilogram of methyl bromide show a wide range across the 
sectors and also among users within the same sector.  The economic loss for 
structural/storage uses of methyl bromide appear to be much higher than those to crop 
producers.  Wide variation in economic losses among methyl bromide users would 
provide users with more flexibility in meeting their required reduction of methyl 
bromide with marketable permit system.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
      The potential cost savings were measured as differences between the total costs 
of marketable permit systems to the U.S. agricultural production sectors and those of a 
direct and fixed allocation of CUEs according to historical methyl bromide use or 
commodity production.  The potential cost savings of marketable permit systems were 
estimated using the assumption that 39% of the 1991 U.S. baseline (reflecting the size 
of the U.S. nomination) would be exempted for critical needs for methyl bromide use 
after the phase-out. Three different schemes for initial allocation were analyzed to 
estimate the potential maximum and minimum cost savings associated with the use of 
marketable permit systems.  They are: (1) high-cost scenario where all the permits are 
given to the applicants with lower costs in each sector, (2) low-cost scenario where all 
the permits are given to the applicants with higher costs in each sector, and (3) average-
cost scenario where all the users in each sector are required to have the same 
percentage reduction in their uses of methyl bromide.  The maximum cost savings 
would occur when all the permits in each sector are distributed to the applicants with 
lower adjustment costs, while minimum cost saving would be associated with the case   14 
when the applicants with higher adjustment costs in each sector are given the permits to 
use methyl bromide.  
      This study does not address trading for sectors in which no technically feasible 
alternatives have been identified or all the 2005 requested amounts of methyl bromide 
were included in the U.S. nomination.  The sectors in this category are cucurbits, 
turfgrass, sweet potatoes, eggplant, strawberry nursery, and tobacco.  Therefore, this 
study incorporates for 81% of the total requests by sectors in 2005, for the purposes of 
estimating potential efficiency gains from trading.  The cost savings of marketable 
permit system estimated in this study would be smaller than the case that all 16 sectors 
were allowed to trade their permits.
3   
      Table 3 shows the potential cost savings of marketable permit systems.  If 
critical use exemptions were allocated to users with higher incremental costs under a 
fixed allocation system, then a marketable permit design would provide the smallest 
cost savings.  This is because there is not much of need for permit trading.  At the same 
time, identifying and allocating methyl bromide to users with high incremental 
switching costs could require substantial transaction costs and would not be 
uncontroversial.  On the other hand, the more the applicants with lower incremental 
switching costs are given the critical use exemptions, the higher the potential cost 
savings could be.  If 39% of the 1991 baseline were exempted for critical needs for 
methyl bromide, we estimated the total incremental cost under a fixed allocation 
system ranges from $55 to $177 million depending on the allocation of the critical use 
exemption among methyl bromide users.  If methyl bromide critical use exemptions 
                                                                 
3 This may also lead to an overstatement of benefits because the total 2005 requested amount may be 
greater than the current methyl bromide use.   15 
were allocated among all users, reducing methyl bromide use by the same proportion 
for each user, then the estimate of the total cost of adjustment is $120 million. 
      Under a permit system, where trading occurs only among users in a given sector, 
the total incremental cost was estimated at $55 million.  Under this Sectoral Marketable 
Permit System (SMPS), some sectors have minimal cost savings because there is little 
variation in economic losses per kilogram of methyl bromide. These sectors include 
forest seedling, orchard replant, ornamental nurseries, and ginger.  The SMPS did not 
provide significant cost savings to these sectors in our simulation, while tomato, 
strawberry, pepper, commodity, and food processing sectors enjoyed significant cost 
savings.  In particular, the food-processing sector reduced its cost from $42 to $5.5 
million and tomato sector from $52 to $14.5 million, a result of trading between users 
with high costs and those with low costs of adopting alternatives to methyl bromide. 
      Table 3 also illustrates the incremental costs under a Uniform Marketable Permit 
System (UMPS), when trading occurs across sectors and the permit price is assumed to 
be the marginal cost for the last user switching to methyl bromide alternatives in order 
to sell the permit.  The permit price was $14.49, which corresponds to the economic 
loss per kilogram of methyl bromide measured for the representative user in the forest 
seedling sector.  This marketable permit system is most cost-effective, at $35.5 million, 
when methyl bromide users  are allowed to trade freely across sectors.  The total 
adjustment cost of the UMPS is less than one-third that of a fixed allocation system 
based on proportional reductions among methyl bromide users (average cost scenario 
in Table 3).  The potential cost savings of marketable permit systems could range from 
36% to 80%, depending on the trading system and initial allocation of CUEs   16 
       Payment and receipt of marketable permits among methyl bromide users would 
affect individual income.  Buyers of permits would incur additional costs to purchase 
permits, but this would be more than offset by avoiding costs of adjusting to 
alternatives, so they would realize a net gain from trade.  Users who sell marketable 
permits would enjoy more income because their cost of adjusting to alternatives would 
be less than that value of the permit they sold.  The total costs of meeting a required 
reduction of methyl bromide to the economy as a whole may be minimized using a 
marketable permit system, but it is also important to bear in mind that the initial 
distribution of permits can affect the distribution of gains and losses, and these equity 
considerations may be an important factor in designing a trading system. 
      The potential cost savings estimated in this study were based on the assumption 
that the price of methyl bromide remains at the 2001 price, which was $8.8 to $11 per 
kilogram.   However, it is unlikely that the price of methyl bromide in 2005 will be the 
same as that in 2001.  The price of methyl bromide in United States has increased 
approximately 300 percent over the seven-year period from 1995 to 2001 (US EPA, 
2003a).  The price of methyl bromide has increased due to the decreased production 
levels and the price policies of suppliers.  The potential cost savings associated with 
marketable permit systems will be smaller if the price of methyl bromide increases and 
more growers switch to the alternatives, so the price assumption may lead to 
overestimates of savings from trading.  The cost-effectiveness of a marketable permit 
design also depends on the total amount of the critical use exemption allowed.  Smaller 
amounts of total methyl bromide in CUEs leads to lower savings and a narrower 
market, while greater amounts of CUEs lead to a broader market and more trading.    17 
Similarly, trading across sectors leads to broader markets and greater impetus to trade.  
One factor that may lead to underestimating the gains from a trading system include 
our assumption that the point estimate of costs for a portion of a sector is representative 
of all methyl bromide users in the sector, whereas there may be greater heterogeneity 
among users.  Another factor is heterogeneity in implicit costs of adopting methyl 
bromide alternatives (e.g., transaction costs, R&D) that would lead to gains from 
trading.  
  Theoretically, the different initial allocation of the permits to use methyl bromide 
should not affect the efficient outcome of the permit system.  No one would be worse off 
when permit trading is allowed.  Permits could correct inefficiency in initial allocation 
because trading would tend to allocate methyl bromide to users with the highest costs of 
adoption alternatives.  Initial allocation can, however, affect how much each user gains or 
losses from the CUE allocation process, as well as the transaction costs of the program.  
Below we briefly introduce and discuss four possible options for allocating initial 
permits.  Each option varies widely in the method and amount of information required to 
distribute the initial allocation of permits. 
 
Allocation to CUE Applicants 
  In this option, the permits could be allocated to the individuals or organizations 
submitting CUE applications to the U.S. government, based on the U.S. nomination 
affirmed by the International Parties to the Montreal Protocol.  CUE applicants who 
incurred significant costs in applying for a CUE would probably favor this option, which 
implicitly confers to them a property right to the initial distribution of permits.  Methyl   18 
bromide users not represented among those applicants would have to buy permits to be 
able to use methyl bromide.  Because most of the CUE applicants are not individual 
users, but consortia representing many users, this option requires a process to distribute 
the permits to individual users in each consortium.  Permits could be distributed to 
consortia that completed CUE applications, and the consortia might distribute permits to 
their members.  However, there are many ways consortia could use to make distributions 
to members, with many potential equity issues.  The U.S. nomination was based on users 
with a critical need for methyl bromide, which for many sectors was less than applicants’ 
request.  The challenge for consortia under this allocation scheme, therefore, is to 
distribute permits to members with a critical need for methyl bromide use, recognizing 
heterogeneity among members in a consortium, with respect to costs of adopting 
alternatives. 
 
Allocation by Grandfathering 
  Permits could be distributed in proportion to historical use, for the types of uses 
and regions granted a CUE.  This option could be satisfactory to current methyl bromide 
users, but would reward those who have used the most methyl bromide in the past.  Those 
who have already switched to methyl bromide alternatives could receive fewer permits 
under this system. This option would provide an incentive to use as much methyl 
bromide as possible now in order to get the most permits. 
 
Output-based Allocation   19 
  In this option, permits would be distributed in proportion to the acres grown by 
each grower of a crop in a region.  For post-harvest uses, allocation could be based on the 
volume of commodity treated or by the area treated (for structural uses).  This option 
treats all users equally according to output, but not necessarily according to patterns of 
production costs.  Users who already switched to alternatives would be rewarded by 
being able to sell their permits.  However, this option might not be viewed as fair by 
others who attempt to buy permits to supplement their initial allocation. 
 
Allocation Auction 
  Permits could also be distributed to the highest bidder among those uses covered 
by the CUE.  This option would probably lead to minimal permit trading, if any.  Some 
users may object to bidding for permits after incurring the cost of applying for the CUE.  
A small portion of auction proceeds could be to applicants to offset part of the costs of 
applying for the CUE, or a portion of the CUE could be allocated for applicants, again to 
offset costs.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Marketable permit trading for methyl bromide critical use exemptions could 
significantly reduce economic losses to current methyl bromide users, when they are 
faced with adopting less effective pesticide alternatives.  The effectiveness of marketable 
permit trading largely depends on the four factors; 1) heterogeneity in the incremental 
costs associated with alternatives, 2) the initial allocation of the critical use exemptions, 
3) price of methyl bromide, and 4) total amount of the critical use exemption allowed.    20 
This study shows that there are considerable variations of the incremental costs among 
the methyl bromide uses, and that this could lead to gains from trade in CUEs.  The 
allocation system affects the distribution of gains from trade (but not overall efficiency), 
and we explored several different options for allocation.  The total amounts of the critical 
use exemptions influence the total size of potential efficiency gains.  The potential 
savings of marketable permit trading to methyl bromide critical use exemptions are likely 
to be significant, compared to a fixed allocation system.  However, the size of the savings 
cannot be measured accurately until the allocation and the total amounts of the critical 
use exemptions are determined and price of methyl bromide in 2005 can be reasonably 
forecasted.  This also forms the basis for the continued research in this area.    21 
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Table 1: Total Methyl Bromide Request and U.S. Nomination for each sector in 
2005.   
Sector  Total Request by Sector  
(kilograms) 
U.S. Sector Nomination 
(kilograms) 
Fresh Market Tomatoes  5,233,521  2,865,262 
Strawberries  2,893,763  2,468,873 
Cucurbits
1  1,187,773  1,187,773 
Peppers  2,003,793  1,085,265 
Orchard Replant
2  1,256,223   706,176 
Food Processing
3   612,576   536,328 
Turfgrass  791,427  352,194 
Sweet Potatoes  224,528  224,528 
Forest Seedlings
4  454,289  192,515 
Commodity Uses
5  135,828  87,753 
Eggplant  163,173  73,565 
Strawberry Nursery  380,948  54,988 
Orchard Seedlings
6  290,088  45,789 
Ornamental Nurseries
7  267,461  29,412 
Ginger  18,336  9,221 
Tobacco  4,612  1,323 
Total  15,918,339  9,920,968 
Percentage of 1991  
Baseline (25,527,550) 
62%  39% 
 
1Cucurbits represents a crop group that includes cucumbers, melons, cantaloupes, 
honeydews, watermelons, and various squash varieties. 
2Orchard replant represents stone fruit (including cherry, peach, nectarine, plum, and 
prune), almonds, walnuts, and grapes. 
3Food Processing represents rice milling, flour milling, pet food manufacturing, and 
bakeries. 
4Forest Seedlings represent seedlings of conifers and hardwoods. 
5Commodity Uses represent dried fruits, nuts, beans, and meat warehouses. 
6Orchard Seedlings represent fruit tree nurseries that includes citrus, peaches, prunes, 
nectarines, cherries, plums, apples, avocados, pears, ornamental fruit trees, and raspberry 
nurseries. 
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Table 2: The Technically Feasible Alternatives and Economic Losses per 
Kilogram. 
 
Sector  Technically Feasible Alternatives  Economic Losses per 





1,3 D + Chloropicrin
1; 
1,3 D + Chloropicrin + Pebulate; 
Metam sodium 
$6.14 – $95.96 
Strawberries  1,3 D + Chloropicrin; 
1,3 D + Metam sodium 
$17.28 – $46.72 
Cucurbits  Metam sodium  $6.72 - $37.42 
Peppers  1,3 D + Chloropicrin  $4.15 – $20.02 
Orchard Replant  1,3 D; 
1,3 D + Metam sodium; 
1,3 D + Chloropicrin 
$10.98 - $43.91 
Food Processing  Heat treatment  $71 - $602 
Turfgrass  No technically feasible alternatives 
available 
Not available 
Sweet Potatoes  Fallow/crop rotation  $9.02 
Forest Seedlings  Dazomet w/tarp; 
Metam sodium; 
1,3 D + Chloropicrin + Pebulate; 
$7.71 - $45.32 
Commodity 
Uses 
Phosphine  $80 - $607 










1,3 D + Metam sodium; 
1,3 D + Chloropicrin; 





$8.68 - $21.72 
Ginger  Metam sodium; 
Fallow 
$20.19  
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Table 3:  Cost Savings of Marketable Permit Systems 
 
Command and Control System  Sectoral Marketable Permit System  
(SMPS)
4 
Uniform Marketable Permit 
System (UMPS)
5  
Incremental Cost to the Sector in 1,000 $  























Bromide use in  
1,000 kg 
Incremental 














135  47  $14,745  $7,531  $3,752  47  $3,752  0  $680 
Food 
Processing 
606  75  $41,937  $31,551  $5,353  75  $5,353  0  $1,093 
Forest 
Seedling 
443  262  $4,353  $3,671  $2,549  262  $2,549  364  $2,344 
Ginger 
 
18  9  $184  $184  $184  9  $184  0  $132 
Orchard 
Replant 
1,091  384  $16,883  $12,539  $4,560  384  $4,560  374  $4,258 
Orchard 
Seedling 
290  244  $3,424  $3,382  $3,164  244  $3,164  244  $3,161 
Ornamental 
Nurseries 
267  238  $5,142  $4,804  $4,758  238  $4,758  32  $3,266 
Pepper  2,004 
 
919  $18,389  $14,315  $9,502  919  $9,502  632  $7,918 
Strawberry  2,894 
 
425  $19,851  $10,592  $7,342  425  $7,342  0  $6,157 
Tomatoes 
 
5,234  2,368  $52,272  $31,615  $14,541  2,368  $14,541  3,327  $6,539 
Total 
 
12,981  4,972  $177,180  $120,193  $55,706  4,972  $55,706  4,972  $35,546 
1 High-cost scenario represents the case when all the permits are initially allocated to the applicants with lower costs in each sector. 
2 Average-cost scenario represents the case when all the applicants in each sector are required to have the same percentage 
   reduction in their uses of methyl bromide to meet the U.S. nominations in each sector.  
3 Low-cost scenario represents the case when all the permits are initially allocated to the applicants with higher costs in each sector. 
4 Sectoral Marketable Permit System (SMPS) allows one-to-one permit trading only for the CUE applicants in the same sector. 
5 Uniform Marketable Permit System (UMPS) allows all the CUE applicants freely trade their methyl bromide permits to use by 
   one-to-one basis.   
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Appendix A: The Technically Feasible Alternatives and Economic Losses for each CUE Application in 2005.   
 
Sector  CUE 
Application 
Technically Feasible Alternatives  2005 Applicant 
Requested  
(in kilograms) 
Economic Losses per 
Kilogram of Methyl 
Bromide 
Tomato #1   Chloropicrin  52,348  $95.96 
Tomato #2  1,3 D + Chloropicrin + Metam 
sodium 
136,078  $24.77 
Tomato #2  1,3 D + Herbicide  453,592  $29.59 
Tomato #3  1,3 D + Chloropicrin + Pebulate  902,603  $23.34 
Tomato #4  1,3 D + Chloropicrin   3,326,644  $6.14 








                                                    Total kilograms requested :   5,233,521 
Straw #1  1,3 D +  Chloropicrin  2,041,164  $17.28 
Straw #2  1,3 D +  Chloropicrin  272,908  $35.83 
Straw #3  1,3 D +  Chloropicrin  579,691  $46.72 
Strawberries 
                                                    Total kilograms requested :   2,893,763 
Cuke #1  Metam sodium  28,187  $37.42 
Cuke #2  No Technically Feasible Alternative  753,688  N/A 
Cuke #3  Metam sodium  92,874  $6.71 
Cuke #4  No Technically Feasible Alternative  67,224  N/A 
Cucurbits 
Cuke #5  Metam sodium  245,800  $6.92 
                                                       Total kilograms requested :  1,187,773 
Pepper #1  1,3 D +  Chloropicrin  181,437  $4.15 
Pepper #2  1,3 D +  Chloropicrin  112,445  $6.69 
Pepper #3  1,3 D +  Chloropicrin  338,248  $6.69 
Pepper #4  1,3 D +  Chloropicrin  1,371,662  $20.02 
Peppers 
                                                     Total kilograms requested :  2,003,793 
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Sector  CUE 
Application 
Technically Feasible Alternatives  2005 Applicant 
Requested  
(in kilograms) 
Economic Losses per 
Kilogram of Methyl 
Bromide 
OrchSeed #1  1,3 D + Chloropicrin  46,510  $18.60 
OrchSeed #2  1,3 D + Chloropicrin  224,528  $12.92 




                                                      Total kilograms requested :   290,088 
Food #1  Heat Treatment  202,756  $71 
Food #2  Heat Treatment  14,742  $433 
Food #3  Heat Treatment  48,081  $582 
Food #4  Heat Treatment  340,194  $602 
Food 
Processing 
                                                    Total kilograms requested :   612,576 
Turf #1  No Technically Feasible Alternatives  680,388  N/A  Turfgrass 
Turf #2  No Technically Feasible Alternatives  111,039  N/A 
                                                       Total kilograms requested :  791,427 
Sweet Potato  SweetPot #1  Crop rotation  224, 528  $9.02 
Forest #1  Dazomet with tarping  246,032  $10.15 
Forest #2  Dazomet with tarping  41,730  $8.76 
Forest #3  Dazomet with tarping  20,412  $7.71 
Forest #4  Dazomet with tarping  52,390  $14.49 
Forest #5  Dazomet with tarping  4,264  $28.89 
Forest #6  Dazomet with tarping  22,453  $24.62 
Forest #7  Dazomet with tarping  24,752  $14.34 
Forest #8  Dazomet with tarping  33,112  $34.61 
Forest #9  Dazomet with tarping  9,144  $45.32 
Forest 
Seedling 
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Sector  CUE 
Application 
Technically Feasible Alternatives  2005 Applicant 
Requested  
(in kilograms) 
Economic Losses per 
Kilogram of Methyl 
Bromide 
Commodity #1  No Technically Feasible Alternative  181  N/A 
Commodity #2  Phosphine  12,088  $218 
Commodity #3  Phosphine  20,412  $414 
Commodity #4  Phosphine  4,536  $607 
Commodity #5  Phosphine  97,704  $80 







                                                      Total kilograms requested :   135,828 
Eggplant #1  No Technically Feasible Alternative  48,868  N/A 
Eggplant #2  No Technically Feasible Alternative  114,305  N/A 
Eggplant 
                                                    Total kilograms requested :   163,173 
StrawNurs #1  No Technically Feasible Alternative  358,338  N/A  Strawberry 
Nursery  StrawNurs #2  No Technically Feasible Alternative  22,611  N/A 
                                                       Total kilograms requested :  380,948 
OrchRep #1  1,3 D +  Chloropicrin  716,449  $43.91 
OrchRep #2  No Technically Feasible Alternative  165,561  N/A 
OrchRep #3  1,3 D +  Chloropicrin  226,796  $10.98 
OrchRep #4  1,3 D +  Chloropicrin  147,417  $10.98 
Orchard 
Replant 
                                                     Total kilograms requested :  1,256,223 
Ornament #1  Steam sterilization  31,593  $8.68 
Ornament #2  1,3 D + hoeing  235,868  $21.72 
Ornamental 
Nurseries 
                                                     Total kilograms requested :  267,461 
Ginger  Ginger  Fallow  18,336  $20.19 
Tobacco  Tobacco  No Technically Feasible Alternative  4,612  N/A 
 
 